Рациональные экономисты против разумных юристов: отличительные особенности общепринятого понятия здравого смысла

Аннотация на английском языке:

Normative theories of judgment either focus on the rational standard – decontextualized preference maximization, or the reasonable standard – the pragmatic balance of preferences and socially-conscious norms. Despite centuries of theoretical work on such concepts, a critical question appears overlooked: How do people’s intuitions and behavior about these concepts relate to theoretical frameworks advanced in economics, politics, and the law? We show that people sustain both standards of judgmental competence, evidenced in spontaneous descriptions, and the personality characteristics and behavioral strategies they attribute to rational vs. reasonable agents. We document this rational/reasonable distinction in written media across multiple languages (English, Russian, Portuguese, Spanish). Further, experiments among North Americans and Pakistani bankers, street merchants, and samples engaging in exchange (vs. market-) economy show that rationality and reasonableness lead people to different conclusions about what constitutes good judgment in dilemmas that pit self-interest against fairness: Rationality is reductionist and instrumental, whereas reasonableness integrates preferences with particulars and moral concerns. 

 Лекция состоится 24 июня 2019 г. (понедельник), в 15-00 в департаменте психологии НИУ ВШЭ по адресу: Армянский переулок 4 стр.2, ауд.418

Язык лекции : английский

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